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Abstract: 
Reliable information about the progress of the Holocaust was not readily available before the end of the 
Second World War.  It has been argued that the Allies could not have saved more Jews under the given 
circumstances.  The analysis of two important first-hand reports of 1942 and 1944 suggest, however, a 
different interpretation.  These reports were dramatic in their impact and instrumental in bringing about 
rescue efforts.  If these documents had not been subject to restrictions and delays in reaching a wide 
readership, they could have been even more effective in mobilizing public opinion in support of rescue 
missions. 
 
Text of paper: 
The “Myth” and Reality of Rescue from the Holocaust: 
The Karski-Koestler and Vrba-Wetzler Reports 
 William D. Rubinstein writes at the outset of his recent book about the Myth of 
Rescue “that no Jew who perished during the Nazi Holocaust could have been saved by 
any action which the Allies could have taken at the time, given what was actually known 
about the Holocaust, what was actually proposed at the time and what was realistically 
possible.”i)  An important factor in the complex web of Rubinstein’s closely argued 
thesis is the matter of reliable information available to the Allies and to the public they 
represented.  Realistic options depended on precise knowledge about the Nazi plans of 
a “final solution.”  Therefore, a precondition for a balanced and reliable judgment about 
“the myth of rescue” is a determination of when crucial information into the hands of 
the Allies, who had access to it, and what was done about it.  Rubenstein does not 
devote serious attention to these questions. 
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 Two reports—because of their spectacular nature—deserve special attention.  
They are without parallel in laying bare the previously unimagined dimensions of the 
Nazi exterminations plans: Jan Karski’s report about the situation in Poland in 1942, 
transmitted on the BBC by Arthur Koestler, and the Auschwitz report of Rudolf Vrba and 
Alfred Wetzler of April 1944.  The first of these two reports about the progress of the 
Holocaust came to London from Poland, only a few months after the crucial Wannsee 
Conference, with clear evidence of a systematic killing in progress.  The author of the 
report, who represented the Polish underground, probably followed his leaders’ wishes 
in not identifying himself. 
 . . . I am not a Jew myself, and before the war I had very little contact with Jews; 
in fact, I knew practically nothing about them.  But, at present, the extermination 
of the Jews has a special significance.  The sufferings of my own Polish 
compatriots are terrible, and they are, of course, nearer to my heart; but the 
methods employed by the enemy against Poles and against Jews are different. 
 Us, the Poles, they try to reduce to a mediaeval race of serfs.  They want to 
deprive us of our cultural standards, of our traditions, of our education, and 
reduce us to a nation of robots.  But the policy towards the Jews is different.  It is 
not a policy of subjugation and oppression, but of cold and systematic 
extermination.  It is the first example in modern history that a whole nation (not 
10, 20, and 30, but 100 per cent of them) are meant to disappear from this 
earth. ii 
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 Despite the delineation of distinctions between Poles and Jews, Karski’s words leave no 
doubt that he was deeply concerned about the fate of the Jews.  In an earlier report to the 
Polish government-in-exile as recently as February 1940, Karski had given a negative 
assessment of the behavior of Jews, who, clearly in conflict with the Polish national interests, 
appeared to sympathize with the Russians and Bolsheviks.  At that time Karski did not see that 
Jews and Poles could form any kind of alliance.iii  An overwhelming experience shortly before 
his departure from Poland in October 1942 transformed his views.  Karski still stressed that his 
loyalty to Poland took precedence over his strong sympathies for the Jewish fate.  But now he 
recognized that the Jews faced the threat of “cold and systematic extermination.”  He finally 
saw the Nazi onslaught as an unprecedented event in modern history. 
 The experiences that transformed Karski were face-to-face encounters with the Nazi 
machinery of systematic killing.  Although gas chambers were already in operation at Belzec, 
Karski found access only to a portion of the camp that employed a less efficient but equally 
brutal method of extermination.  Disguised in a police uniform and under the guidance of an 
Estonian guard of the Gestapo, Karski was able to observe from close range masses of Jews 
being forced into the freight cars of a train, each designed normally for at most eight horses or 
forty soldiers, but now forced to hold 120-130 people. 
The details of how they die are simple and revolting: the chloride of lime on the floor 
has the property of developing chlorine gas when coming into contact with humidity.  
The people jammed into the trucks for many hours are compelled, at some time, to 
urinate, and this (on the lime), instantaneously produces a chemical reaction.  Death 
must in the end be welcome, for whilst they are dying by the chlorine gas their feet are 
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being burned to the bone by the chemically active chloride.  As I said, the number 
executed in one death train is about 6,000 at a time.iv 
From his guide Karski learned that trains, following the pattern he observed, had been 
dispatched at the rate of one or two per week for several months.  The trains moved with their 
victims about twenty-five miles to an open field, and there, Karski was told by his guide, the 
bodies were dumped into mass graves. 
 Arthur Koestler, who. soon after Karski’s arrival in London in November of 1942, met the 
messenger from occupied Poland, took on the assignment of interviewing and communicating 
Karski’s report to the general public.  Koestler remembered Karski as “a very modest, 
unassuming, very tall, rather aristocratic Pole.”  Although Koestler had been the recipient of 
numerous reports of Nazi atrocities and taken part in efforts to inform the general public, he 
was aware that this report was different, and he was tormented by the difficulty of his task.  “I 
tried to make out a proper script,” he confided,”but it just doesn’t come off.  I have done too 
much of this sort of thing, and I am paralyzed by the feeling that the facts are so horrible that 
nobody will believe them.”  After considerable delay the BBC transmitted Koestler’s report in 
June 1943.  The comparison of Koestler’s text, published in a pamphlet, Terror in Europe, with 
Karski’s narrative Story of a Secret State, published following year, shows that the text that 
Koestler helped to prepare was incomplete.  His account only contained the visit to Belzec and 
lacked another, equally significant experience.  Missing from Koestler’s narrative is the 
description of Karski’s two visits to the Warsaw Ghetto, also made with the aid and with the 
guidance of the Jewish underground.  These visits, which preceded the trip to Belzec, 
represented crucial experiences that helped Karski grasp essential elements of the Nazi’s secret 
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campaign against the Jews.  If Karski was convincing in his interviews with political leaders in 
London and Washington, his persuasiveness was certainly based on his broad experience. 
 Descending first into the cellar of an apartment building on the “Aryan” side of the 
Ghetto and wearing ragged clothes with a yellow Jewish star, Karski and two Jewish 
companions, one of whom was Leon Feiner, a Warsaw lawyer, labor leader, and head of the 
socialist Bund, made their way through a secret tunnel into the isolated and closely guarded 
Jewish quarter.v  Karski was not prepared for the ghastly scenes that he confronted: 
A cemetery?  No, for these bodies were still moving, were indeed often violently 
agitated.  These were still living people, if you could call them such.  For apart 
from their skin, eyes, and voice there was nothing human left in these palpitating 
figures.  Everywhere there was hunger, misery, the atrocious stench of 
decomposing bodies, the pitiful moans of dying children, the desperate cries and 
gasps of a people struggling for life against impossible odds.vi 
Sickened by what he saw, after observing Hitler youths playing target practice by 
shooting down Jews, Karski was unable to keep his composure and asked to be led out 
of the Ghetto.  He returned later, however, to collect further information about the 
details of the Nazi operations and thus “to memorize more vividly my visual 
impressions.”vii 
 The Warsaw ghetto and the camp at Belzec were the basis of the reports Karski 
took to General Sikorski and other Polish exile leaders in London.  Although his report 
certainly dealt only with the Jewish plight as one of several important issues facing 
Poland under the Nazis, the images he conveyed about the Jews could not have been 
“The ‘Myth’ and Reality of Rescue from the Holocaust: The Karski–Koestler and Vrba–Wetzler Reports.“ 
The Yearbook of the Research Centre for German and Austrian Exile Studies 2 (2000), pp. 171–208. 
Publisher’s official version: http://www.rodopi.nl/senj.asp?BookId=exile+2.  Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu. 
6 
 
more dramatic.  The impact disabled, if only temporarily, general resistance in Polish 
government circles to making the Jewish issue a question of policy priority during the 
war; the new, reliable information, in concert with other reports converging from 
different directions, forced the allies to discuss advisability of a common declaration.viii  
Issued jointly by several governments, including Britain, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States, on December 17, the declaration condemned “the bestial policy of cold-
blooded extermination.”ix 
 The effectiveness of Karski’s interviews was due in no small part to his ability to 
confirm with a great degree of credibility what had been reported widely by second-
hand sources.  The enormity of the crimes and the expectations of the Jewish leaders 
who entrusted Karski with the task of informing the Allies (“Tell them that the earth 
must be shaken to its foundations; the world must be aroused.”x) required an 
unprecedented power from the spoken and written words.  It was as if a new genre of 
communication had to be invented.  Karski claimed that he developed a method for 
delivering his message.  He found that “the most effective way of getting *his+ material 
across was not to soften or interpret it, but to convey it as directly as possible, 
reproducing not merely ideas and instructions but the language, gestures and nuances 
of those from whom the material came.”xi  The clarity, directness, and simplicity of 
Karski’s language certainly contributed to a powerful impact.  The report became an 
instrument that affected politics at the highest levels.   
 Nevertheless, Karski’s apparent success could impede the view of the mission’s 
darker side.  Although he reached wide audiences and succeeded in talking to heads of 
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state and other people close to the centers of power, his influence on the political 
process was disappointing.  In February he had a chance to report to Anthony Eden.  The 
discussion that followed the report focused on the question of Polish-Soviet relations.  
When Karski asked for permission to see Prime Minister Churchill, Eden denied the 
request.  In June Karski traveled to the United States, where he met Chief Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, who reacted with disbelief to the descriptions of atrocities against the Jews.  
Karski also had an extensive interview with President Roosevelt.  Although he did not go 
into the details of his experiences in the Warsaw Ghetto and in Belzec, Karski was able 
to convey the plight of the Jews in a general way.  Karski relayed the urgent message of 
the Jewish underground: if the Germans did not abandon their plans or the Allies did 
not intervene, the Jewish people of Poland would soon cease to exist. 
 Karski believed that he had failed to move the president to act in behalf of the 
Jews.  However, John Pehle, whom the president appointed as the first head of the War 
Refugee Board, later claimed that the interview with Karski had made a difference in 
Roosevelt’s understanding of the problem.  At any rate, the formation of the War 
Refugee Board was a significant action to deal with the problem of rescue.  It was, 
nonetheless, a late and long overdue action, occurring only in January, 1944.xii  The gulf 
between the cry for help and an effective  rescue effort was considerable. 
 Koestler felt deeply frustrated by failures to convey a sense of urgency.  He read 
Karski’s-report on the BBC in July 1943; shortly thereafter he published his novel Arrival 
and Departure, a work of fiction that included a segment on the progress of the 
Holocaust.xiii  This segment, under the title “Mixed Transport,” was also published in the 
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October issue of Horizon, a prominent literary periodical in Britain during the war years.  
It described the details of mass gassings of Jews in trucks, an operation about which 
Koestler obtained information not from Karski but from another source.  As early as 
January 1942 the first information about gassing vans in Chelmno reached Warsaw; 
then the six-page account of a small group of gravediggers, who succeeded in escaping, 
finally found its way to London.xiv  This account undoubtedly formed the basis of a 
literary text with a documentary character. 
 The reaction of Horizon’s readership to Koestler’s text is noteworthy.  Letters to 
the editor forced the Horizon to react in its November issue.  The editor asked the 
readers “who expressed doubts about the veracity of Koestler’s ‘Mixed Transport’ to 
obtain and read the text of the Polish eye-witness broadcast.”  In the December issue an 
angry Koestler responded to the doubting readers: “. . . you have the brazenness to ask 
whether it is true that you are the contemporary of the greatest massacre in recorded 
history.  If you tell me that you don’t read newspapers, white-books, documentary 
pamphlets obtainable at W.H. Smith bookstalls—why on earth do you read Horizon and 
call yourself a member of the intelligentsia?”  Koestler elaborated in an article in the 
New York Times Magazine (January 1944) on the “Disbelieving the Atrocities.”  He 
reported that according to a recent opinion survey, nine out of ten average American 
citizens believed that the atrocities were propaganda lies.  
 The Karski mission, insofar as it dealt with the Jewish plight, had a significant 
impact.  But in the larger context of the Allied policies or in the matter of influencing 
public opinion, its effectiveness is modest.  Karki defined the essential requirements of 
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imparting his message: not attempting to interpret but to convey the facts precisely.  
The Polish government-in-exile did not see to it immediately that a written in this spirit, 
comprehensive and clearly attributed to Karski, should become widely distributed.  
Instead, this ideal text existed too long primarily in a spoken form, and when it reached 
the inner circles of power, it was often relegated to an inferior position, next to 
competing political agendas.  The question of rescue could not become a realistic war 
aim of the Allies, as the Jewish leaders in Warsaw requested, and  without a radical 
reorientation of public opinion such an expectation was probably unrealistic.  Could a 
more effective exploitation of Karski’s mission have accomplished that?  It is a matter of 
speculation whether as a result of fragmentation and delays, and despite Karski’s and 
Koestler’s sincere efforts, a unique opportunity was missed at a crucial, relatively early 
stage in the progress of the Holocaust. 
 
*  *  * 
 
 Analogous patterns of success and failure can be detected in the fate of the Vrba-
Wetzler report of April 1944.  At this advanced stage of the Holocaust the authors, who 
described the operation of the extermination camp at Aschwitz, had inside information about 
the Nazi’s most closely guarded secret: the past, present, and future of an efficient 
extermination machine.  When they succeeded in escaping and telling their incredible story, 
Vrba and Wetzler provided the world information that it needed to prevent the destruction of 
the Jewish population in Hungary, the next stage in the Nazi designs of annihilation.  When 
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Rudolf Vrba first formulated the title of his book I Cannot Forgive, published in London in 1964, 
he was undoubtedly directing his words to the perpetrators of the hell of Auschwitz, where he 
had been prisoner for almost two years.  At the same time, the report that he and his partner 
Alfred Wetzler wrote shortly after their escape, had a mission similar to the reports of Karski 
and Koestler.  But because the Auschwitz report could not be carried by the two eye-witnesses 
to Hungary or to the West, it was distributed in multiple copies and sent on uncertain journeys 
in different directions.  Its ultimate impact involved many potential agents of rescue as well as 
many more opponents for whom public knowledge about the report appeared to be a threat.  
The authors of the report hoped to impede the efficient operation of the death machine.  Since 
their report, providing forty pages of detail on all aspects of the camp’s organization, purpose, 
and functioning, actually reached Hungary before the deportations to Auschwitz began, this 
text clearly acquired the character of an instrument of rescue.  As one who experienced and 
survived the deportation from Hungary to Auschwitz, Elie Wiesel addresses the challenge and 
apparent failure that this crucial text represented.   
 . . . I believe the tragedy of the Hungarian Jewry is a severe indictment.  Why 
didn't we know?  I could tell you many stories because, after all, I am a 
Hungarian Jew.  And to this day I try to understand what happened.  If ever there 
was a tragedy that could have been prevented, it was that one.xv   
 In early 1944 Hungary was the only remaining European country with any sizable Jewish 
population still essentially unaffected by the "final solution."  By this time the Nazis had 
gathered considerable experience, and they were prepared to solve the Jewish question in 
Hungary with speed and relative ease.  On March 19 German troops moved into Budapest , 
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where they dictated the installment of a new government under Döme Sztojay, who could be 
relied on to carry out their policies.  Ghettos were established and Jews were forced to wear 
yellow stars.  Jews were arrested and concentrated at centers throughout the country.  On May 
15, 1944, the first trainload of Hungarian Jews was on its way to the concentration camp at 
Auschwitz.xvi  By July 8 a significant portion of the operation had been carried out: according to 
the report of the German ambassador in Budapest, 437,402 persons had been deported from 
Hungary.  This figure represented more than half of the Jewish population in Hungary and 
included people of all ages, most of them taken to Auschwitz within a period of about eight 
weeks.xvii  Upon arrival, a very high percentage of the deportees was immediately killed in the 
gas chambers; the rest was assigned work in the camp or moved to other camps, but many met 
their deaths shortly thereafter. 
 Even before German armed forces occupied Hungary, Adolf Eichmann set into motion 
the operation to deport Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.  On March 12, several days before the 
head of the Hungarian government, the regent of Hungary, Admiral Miklós (Nicholas) von 
Horthy, first learned of Hitler's intentions, Eichmann summoned SS officers of his department 
to meet in Linz.  At this time he announced that Hungary was about to be occupied, and he 
outlined the process of liquidating the Jews as a "full-scale Blitz campaign."xviii  Preparations for 
this operation had been in progress for some time, and Auschwitz was an active participant as 
early as January.  New railway tracks were being built in a direct line to the crematoria.  New 
trenches were being dug to bury corpses.  The Nazi guards joked about the Hungarian salami 
that would soon be available in generous amounts.  These developments influenced Vrba to 
find a way out of the death camp.  
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 For almost two years I had thought of escape, first because I wanted my 
freedom; then in a more objective way because I wanted to tell the world what 
was happening in Auschwitz, but now I had an imperative reason.  It was no 
longer a question of reporting a crime, but of preventing one; of warning the 
Hungarians, of rousing them, of raising an army one million strong, an army that 
would fight rather than die.xix 
 Ironically, the Nazi preparations to receive the flood of Hungarians made it possible to 
carry out Vrba's escape.  Members of the Auschwitz underground realized that a large pile of 
planks assembled to build a new receiving ramp offered a possible hiding place an essential 
component in an elaborate escape scheme.  Prisoners engaged in the delivery of the planks 
were bribed to leave an opening in the huge pile of wood, resulting in a hiding place for as 
many as four persons. 
 The planks were in the outer camp, which at night was undefended because all 
prisoners were securely behind the high voltage wires and the watch towers of 
the inner camp.  If they could remain hidden for the three days while all the 
guards stood to and the place was searched, they had a good chance; for at the 
end of three days it would be assumed that they had got beyond the confines of 
Auschwitz and the job of finding them would be handed over to the authorities 
there.  The guard that surrounded the entire camp for those three days would be 
withdrawn and they would merely have to wait until night before sneaking past 
the unmanned outer watch towers.xx 
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 The first four men attempting to escape in this manner were captured by German 
troops outside Auschwitz and returned to the camp.  But efforts of the authorities to extract 
the secret of the escape failed, so there was still hope for others.  Vrba and Wetzler were then 
able to carry out the same plan and successfully elude all German troops surrounding the camp.  
On April 9 a telegram from SS Officer Hartenstein reported to the Berlin Gestapo office that 
Vrba and Wetzler had escaped two days before and that Himmler himself had been informed of 
the matter.xxi  After about ten days of adventurous marching to the south the two young 
Slovaks reached the Czechoslovak village of Skalite and then continued on to Zilina.  Here they 
were able to contact a few surviving Jewish leaders and to begin to tell their story.xxii 
 Oscar Krasnansky (Krasznyansky), a chemical engineer and Zionist leader, met the two 
escapees and arranged for a German translation of the report that resulted from his interviews.  
Before their report was actually written down, Vrba and Wetzler related their experiences in 
the Slovak language separately.  Soon it became evident that the witnesses of the 
extermination camp were reliable.  The two independent accounts were combined, and details 
were added whenever one of the two men could supply details of matters that the other had 
not experienced.  In this manner a lengthy report came into being, simultaneously in Slovakian 
and in German.  It was completed on April 26.xxiii  
 Both Vrba and Wetzler managed to survive by having several jobs that spared them of 
death, for significant periods as “scribes,” performing primarily clerical work.  They had more 
freedom than others in moving about in the camp and observing incoming transports.  From a 
very early stage they were able to commit to memory the dates and numbers and sizes of 
transports (including names of persons in specific transports), their countries of origin, the 
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numbers selected for work in the camp and for death in the gas chambers, the processing, 
tatooing, disinfecting, executions, “selections,” “quarantine” arrangements, gassings, and 
cremation..  The report describes the size and location of all buildings, the gas chambers, 
disguised as bath houses, connected to the crematoria (shown also in sketches), the 
relationship of the old camp to the new one (Birkenau), the positions of the double fences, and 
the inner and outer belts of watch towers.  The administrative structure is outlined, showing at 
the lower levels the crucial role of the block leaders, and the capos who were in charge of small 
work units.  The report concludes with a summary of the transports and the totals of killed in 
Auschwitz in the period from April 1942 to April 19944: Poland (shipped by trucks) ca. 300,000; 
Poland (shipped by trains) 600,000; Holland 100,000; Greece 45,000’ France 150,000; Belgium 
50,000; Germany 60,000; Yugoslavia, Italy, Norway 50,000; Lithuania 50,000; Bohemia, 
Moravia, Austria 30,000; Slovakia 30,000; various camps of foreign Jews in Pland 300,000, 
coming to a total of ca. 1,765,000.  Maria Szekely, who later translated the report in Budapest, 
observed: “In contrast to the trickling news items available, the report revealed the total and 
terrible reality of the extermination of human beings, organized methodically and pedantically, 
planned as a crime of massive proportions. . . This report is exempt from feeling; the text is dry, 
as if the authors simply wrote about how one should bake bread . . “xxiv 
 The crucial step of distribution followed immediately after the completion of the report.  
Krasnansky recalls that the report was sent to Rudolf Kastner in Budapest, Nathan Schwalb in 
Geneva, and the liaison committee in Istanbul.  One copy was handed to the papal nuncio 
[Giuseppe Burzio] in Bratislava to be forwarded to the Vatican.  Independently of Krasnansky’s 
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addressees, a copy also reached the underground in Budapest.  The path and impact of each of 
these copies, though complex, can be reconstructed. 
 Dr. Rudolf Kastner (Rezsö Kasztner), a lawyer and deputy chairman of the Hungarian 
Zionist Organization, offered a direct line of communication to the potential victims of 
extermination.  After Vrba and Wetzler had reported to Slovakian Jewish leaders about 
Auschwitz, these leaders assured the escapees that they were in daily contact with the 
Hungarian Jewish leaders and that the report about Auschwitz would be in their hands "first 
thing tomorrow."  The following day Vrba was told that Kastner, "the most important man" in 
Hungarian Jewish affairs, was examining the report "at this very minute."xxv  He was expected to 
get the report to the head of the Hungarian state and the head of the Catholic Church in 
Hungary.  But the expectation of results from Kastner's involvement proved to be futile.  He did 
not help to inform Hungarian Jews of the fate that awaited them.  The argument used by Jewish 
leaders to justify the silence about the Auschwitz report was the fear of panic.xxvi  But for 
Kastner another consideration militated for silence.  Because he was negotiating at this time 
with the Gestapo about a German offer to exchange the lives of Jews for goods and money, the 
circulation of the report evidently threatened to undermine his work with the Nazis.  Although 
he kept the report secret in the hope of saving lives, Kastner became in a sense an accomplice 
in a conspiracy of silence.  Eichmann himself referred later to a "gentlemen's agreement" with 
Kastner, who allegedly agreed to remain silent and to "help keep the Jews from resisting 
deportation and even keep order in the collection camps" in exchange for the opportunity to 
rescue fifteen to twenty thousand Jews.  With Rudolf Kastner the Auschwitz report reached a 
dead end. 
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 The report arrived in Budapest at the end of April or, at the latest, during the first few 
days of May.  Although it is not clear who took one of the copies prepared in Bratislava to 
Hungary and how it found its way into the hands of a representative of the Hungarian 
resistance movement, Dr. Géza Soós (consultant at the Hungarian Foreign Ministry), it is, 
nevertheless, a fact that for the history of Jews in Hungary this particular report was decisive.   
 Interviews conducted by the Hungarian journalist Sándor Szenes in 1981 with four 
participants of the dramatic events of subsequent days, follow the path of this particular text.  
The interviews reconstruct the essential features of the actions that the report inspired.  
Together with the text of the report, the interviews provide a solid documentary basis for the 
answers to crucial questions: What did Hungarian leaders learn about Auschwitz and when?  
How did they react?  Did they take decisive action?  If not, why not? 
 How Hungarian leaders evaluated the news from Auschwitz and how they reacted to 
the report cannot be isolated from the history of repressive measures imposed on the Jewish 
population even before the German occupation.  Regent Horthy came to power after World 
War I, and reacted to the presence of Jews in the Communist government it replace with a 
campaign of anti-Semitism.xxvii  Later, responding to increasing pressure from the German 
government, even church leaders were implicated in the moves to restrict the rights of Jews.  
With the support of Catholics as well as Protestants, the anti-Semitic laws of 1938-1939 
dictated restrictions on the lives of Jews.  About 100,000 Christian Jews were classified simply 
as Jews.  When extermination threatened all persons designated as Jews in 1944, church 
leaders were prevented--by the laws that they had helped to create--from decisive action to 
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save even the Christian Jews.xxviii  Those who participated in actions against Jews were not likely 
to become their fervent protectors.  
 According to József Éliás in his interview with Sándor Szenes, the opposition movement 
in Nazi-occupied Hungary had believed that church leaders were in the best position to 
undertake rescue efforts at a time when the government was collaborating with the Nazis.  The 
first addressees of the Auschwitz report included, therefore, the leaders of the Catholic, 
Calvinist, and Lutheran churches.  Calvinist Bishop László Ravasz emerges as the leader most 
convinced that an immediate response was essential.  According to Éliás, Bishop Ravasz wrote 
to Prime Minister Sztójay as early as May 17, warning him about the deportations being, in 
effect, mass killings and genocide.  In the name of Protestant churches, Bishop Ravasz implored 
the government to stop the atrocities, but the letter also declared that for the time being the 
issue would not be brought to the public's attention.xxix  Bishop Ravasz also wrote to Catholic 
Cardinal Serédi about a public stand about the "inhumane methods" in handling the "Jewish 
question."  But he set as a precondition for this public declaration an effort by a delegation of 
churches to warn government leaders.  Cardinal Serédi did not cooperate.xxx  Since Serédi 
represented the largest segment of the Hungarian population, his cooperation was essential.  
The interviews demonstrate that he resisted efforts to take a public stand.  Ravasz also made an 
effort to convince Horthy about the seriousness of the situation.  Géza Soós, who played a key 
role in the transmission of the Auschwitz report to state and church leaders in Budapest, 
described Horthy's crisis in his interview with American intelligence officers.  Soós had escaped 
from Hungary in December of 1944.  Besides bringing a copy of the Auschwitz Report, he 
provided the US Army Intelligence unit in Italy (OSS) with details about the political situation in 
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Hungary and the question of the deportations.  Soós asserted that upon learning the purpose of 
the deportations Bishop Ravasz went directly to Horthy at the end of May.   
 [Ravasz] asked Horthy if he knew what crimes were being committed in his 
name.  The Regent replied that the Germans had asked for a half a million 
Hungarian workers to be sent to German war plants and that Sztójay had asked 
the Germans to take Jews instead of Hungarians.  Both Sztójay and Veesenmayer 
had stated that Hitler promised that these Jews would be treated exactly as 
Hungarian workers.  The Regent had asked how long it was intended to keep 
these workers in Germany, adding that it was not wise to separate providers 
from their families.  Sztójay replied that the Germans understood this and had 
asked that only entire families should be sent there.  When Ravasz insisted that 
the Jews were being mistreated, the Regent became angry and informed the 
Bishop that he was not accustomed to having his word questioned.  The Regent 
ended the interview by suggesting to Ravasz that he see Sztójay.xxxi   
 About the time of Bishop Ravasz's visit a "Memorandum on the Situation of the 
Hungarian Jewry," dated May 25, 1944, reached Horthy.  It contained details about the 
concentration of Jews in ghettos and factories.xxxii 
 If Bishop Ravasz did not appear to convince Horthy of the seriousness of the situation, 
Horthy's statements only a few days later, in early June, show that he had acquired new 
information and reflect a dramatic shift.  At this time, Horthy complained to Prime Minister 
Sztójay that the measures against the Jews in Hungary were brutal and inhumane. 
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 Among the measures is the treatment of the Jewish problem in a manner of not 
conforming to the Hungarian mind, nor corresponding to conditions in Hungary, 
and in turn to Hungarian interests.  Above all, it is clear that I was not in a 
position to prevent anything that was a German measure in this line, or a 
government measure enacted on German demand, so that in this respect I was 
forced to a passive attitude.  Although in this way not only I could obtain no 
advance knowledge of the measures taken, but even subsequently I was not 
informed of everything, nevertheless of late I have received information to the 
effect that in many respects more had been done here than even by the 
Germans themselves, partly in such a brutal, and sometimes inhuman manner as 
has not even done in Germany.xxxiii 
 Horthy told Sztójay that certain categories of Jews, including converts and those 
valuable for the national economy (engineers, doctors, and technicians) be exempted from the 
anti-Jewish measures.  Although he did not demand an end to the deportations nor did he 
imply that he had knowledge of the death camps, Horthy’s new position suggests that he was 
acting under the influence of the Vrba-Wetzler report and the fact that others were also aware 
of it.  We know from the Szenes interviews that he had received the report by late May or early 
June.xxxiv 
 Within the government there were those who realized that it was no longer possible to 
remain silent about the report.  On June 21, Deputy Foreign Minister Mihály Arnóthy-Jungerth 
informed the Hungarian Council of Ministers that he had in his possession materials according 
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to which the Hungarian Jews were being taken to Auschwitz where they were gassed and 
burned.xxxv  
 Pressures on Regent Horthy to stop the inhumane treatment of the Jews began to 
mount.  As a result of the news about Auschwitz from Switzerland, where in the meantime the 
Vrba-Wetzler report had become known, world leaders addressed warnings to Horthy; at the 
end of June he received stern messages from Pope Pius XII and King Gustav V of Sweden.  A 
warning from the US Legation in Budapest, which referred to a statement by President 
Roosevelt, stated: "Hungary's fate will not be like that of any other civilized nation . . . unless 
the deportations are stopped."xxxvi  The major item of discussion at the June 26 Crown Council 
meeting was the domestic and international protest against Jewish persecution.  As a result, for 
the first time at the highest governmental level a desire to halt the deportations was expressed.  
When government officials (including Prime Minister Sztójay) attempted to defend the German 
policies, Horthy exclaimed:  "I shall not permit the deportations to bring further shame on the 
Hungarians!"xxxvii 
 The sequence of events shows that Horthy acted decisively only after stern warnings 
about this matter came from the Allies, neutral nations, and the Vatican.  If Regent Horthy 
finally took a stand against the deportations, this decision was strongly influenced by the 
pressure from foreign powers and by the belief that Germany was on the verge of defeat.  
When Horthy finally went to the German ambassador on July 4 with a demand to end the 
deportations, he referred to the international uproar as a reason to do so.  Veesenmayer 
reported to Berlin on July 6 that both Horthy and his Prime Minister had complained to him 
about being deluged with telegrams from many parts of Europe urging him to stop the 
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deportations.  Sztójay also complained that the Allies were planning "to bomb collaborating 
Hungarian and German agencies" in Budapest.xxxviii  It is necessary, therefore, to take into 
account how the Auschwitz report reached the West and what impact it had there, and how 
the information served to put pressure on the Hungarian government.. 
 Nathan Schwalb, to whom the report had been sent to Switzerland, was a delegate of 
the Jewish Agency or the Histadrut ha Ovdim [Hehalutz].  According to Krasnansky, secret 
messengers were available to take the report “very reliably” to Schwalb.xxxix  The fate of this 
report--especially the different paths it took, leading to actions or failures to act--had profound 
implications for Hungary.  What happened to the earliest versions of the report sent to Nathan 
Schwalb is not entirely clear.  Schwalb, who was active in encouraging resistance to the Nazis in 
Eastern Europe,xl was reluctant for unexplained reasons to publicize the news about Auschwitz.  
It is possible that he received a version of the report even as early as May, at which time it 
could have played a more effective part in rescue efforts in the West. xli   At the very latest, on 
June 10, the Vrba-Wetzler report arrived in Geneva at the Czech government-in-exile offices, 
where, Dr. Jaromir Kopecky, recognizing its significance, immediately contacted Gerhard 
Riegner of the World Jewish Council, and together they mounted a campaign of telegram 
communications to British and American authorities.  In this way Allen Dulles, head of United 
States Intelligence in Switzerland, received information about Auschwitz and passed it on to 
Roswell McClelland, War Refugee Board representative in Bern.  McClelland cabled the 
information on to Washington on June 16.xlii  
 Another copy of the report, addressed originally to Istanbul, eventually found its way to 
Budapest.  Moshe (Miklós) Krausz, head of the Palestine office in Budapest, received a copy of 
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the Auschwitz report from József Reisner, a Jewish employee of the Turkish legation in 
Budapest.  Krausz took immediate steps to get the information to Switzerland by entrusting 
Florian Manoliu, a member of the Rumanian legation in Bern, who in turn delivered it to 
Georges Mantello (György Mandel), originally a businessman from Transylvania, serving as first 
secretary  
of the general consulate of El Salvador in Geneva.  Mantello reproduced and disseminated it 
immediately.xliii 
 The form in which people received such information could be decisive.  It appears that 
previously Dulles had seen only a brief telegram summary of the report.  A few days later 
Walter Garrett, a representative of the British news agency Exchange Telegraph, who had 
received a copy from Mantello showed it to Allen Dulles.  He said that Dulles read the report in 
his presence, and Garrett observed his profound shock.  "One has to do something 
immediately."  With these words Dulles prepared to send a cable to the secretary of state.  He 
reportedly wired it on the following day, June 23.xliv  As a result of Kopecky's and Mantello's 
communications, the veil of secrecy was lifted.  In the following days no less than 383 articles 
about the Auschwitz death camp appeared in the Swiss press.xlv   
 It is reasonable to assume that the report sent by Giuseppe Burzio from Bratislava on 
May 22 to the Vatican should not have reached the addressee in a reasonable time.  Mario 
Martilotti, a member of papal nuncio’s office in Bern, interviewed Rudolf Vrba and Czeslaw 
Mordowicz (who escaped from Auschwitz shortly after Vrba) for six hours on June 20.  Before 
he left for Switzerland, he promised to do everything in his power to stop the killing in 
Auschwitz.  Erich Kulka believes that Martilotti’s report to the Vatican was the catalyst for the 
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telegram Pius XII adressed to Horthy.xlvi  At any rate, the increasing international attention to 
the Auschwitz report was undoubtedly a factor in influencing Pope Pius XII to address a 
telegram to Regent Horthy on June 25, demanding efforts to prevent the further suffering of so 
many unfortunate human beings.xlvii  
 Only on July 3 did information from the Vrba-Wetzler report receive attention in the 
New York Times.  At this time the United States government initiatives in response to the report 
were behind closed doors. Only at a very late stage, after a period of more than four months, 
did the War Refugee Board make reports about Auschwitz public.  On November 26 the New 
York Times reported on a news conference of the War Refugee Board.  This front-page story 
describes the publication as the "first detailed report by a United States Government Agency 
offering eyewitness proof of mass murder by the Germans." 
 This publication is of special relevance since the U.S. government, in contrast to those in 
Europe, was in a position to act swiftly to stop the death camp operations.  A proposal to 
achieve this end by bombing the railroad lines leading to Auschwitz was sent to authorities as 
early as May 1944.  This plea, clearly a direct consequence of the revelations of Vrba and 
Wetzler, originated from the underground in Bratislava.  On May 17 the message reached Isaac 
Sternbuch, representative of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis in Switzerland, who forwarded it to 
the American legation in Bern.  Sternbuch continued to receive further pleas from Bratislava, 
and he repeatedly requested the Bern legation to relay his messages.xlviii   
 Jacob Rosenheim, a New York representative of the Agudas Israel World 
Organization, in possession of information about the "final solution" and deportations in 
progress in Hungary, contacted high United States officials with a proposal to bomb 
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railroad lines in Kosice and Presov.  On June 24 John W. Pehle, executive director of the 
World Refugee Board, personally took Rosenheim's proposal to John McCloy, the 
assistant secretary of war.  Two days later the operations division of the War 
Department general staff stated that the proposal was impracticable and "could be 
executed only by diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our 
forces now engaged in decisive operations."xlix  In fact, on July  3, when McCloy received 
a memorandum on the bombing proposal, he gave clear instructions to "kill" the 
proposal.l    
 The War Refugee Board first received the full text of the combined Auschwitz reports 
only on November 1, 1944.  The revelations of these first-hand reports and their "horror jolted 
the Board."li  At this late stage there is record of a new effort by a "shocked" Pehle to persuade 
McCloy to arrange for bombing Auschwitz.  But again McCloy rejected the proposal.   
 In retrospect, there is general agreement that bombing railroad lines to Auschwitz 
would have been an effective rescue effort.  Why did such bombing not take place?  Roosevelt 
established the War Refugee Board on January 22, 1944 to take urgent action "to forestall the 
plan of the Nazis to exterminate all Jews and minorities in Europe."lii  If it was the Board's duty 
to consult the president and to get his support to demand action from the War Department, 
the sequence of events in Washington shows a lack of swift communication or consultation.  
The Department of War preferred silence.  McCloy was not persuaded that the atrocity stories 
were true.  His department consistently resisted the use of military forces in rescue operations 
and also opposed the publication of the Auschwitz reports.liii  In light of the failure of the civilian 
government to be insistent and assertive, the pragmatic military position prevailed. 
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 Because a significant change in the position of the War Refugee Board occurred after 
the full texts of the Auschwitz reports became available, it is important to know why the "new" 
evidence was not available earlier.  Officials in Switzerland had much of this evidence in the 
middle of June, but they sent mere summaries to Washington.  Only about four months after 
they had arrived in Switzerland, on October 12, did Roswell McClelland mail them to the War 
Refugee Board in the United States.  In addition to the report by Vrba and Wetzler, he sent the 
reports of three other escapees from Auschwitz: the accounts of Mordowicz-Rosin and the 
"Polish Major" (Jerzy Tabeau)liv.  Translation of the reports from German into English and 
mailing may explain the long delay in part, but McClelland, who had sent cables on the reports 
before, clearly did not consider getting the reports to Washington an urgent matter; he was not 
aware that the reports were essential for building a convincing case for rescue operations.lv  
Thus, the resistance of the War Department was not the only cause of inaction; lack of urgency 
and swift communication were factors.  A significant opportunity to save the lives of those 
destined for the Auschwitz gas chambers to passed by. 
 Regent Horthy took decisive action in July to save the Jewish population still 
residing in Budapest.  On July 6, Horthy prevented 3,000-4,000 gendarmes, who were to 
help carry out the deportations from Budapest, from entering the city by a show of 
military force.  He also ordered a halt to the Hungarian participation in the 
deportations.lvi  Horthy turned to reliable military officers and acted decisively to take 
control.  He appointed a new commander for all forces in Budapest.  He instructed him 
to take all measures necessary to prevent the deportations of the Budapest Jews and to 
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protect the security of the country.lvii.  He demanded the dismissal of all government 
officials who had a role in the deportations.lviii 
 Later events showed that Horthy was unable to follow up his temporary success with 
actions that would put him firmly in control.  A coup d'état deposed Horthy in October; with the 
encouragement and aid of German authorities his government was replaced by one 
sympathetic to Nazi racial policies. Many Jews subsequently became victims of mass killings in 
death marches organized by the fanatically anti-Semitic regime of Ferenc Szálasi.  At this time 
the heroic efforts of Raoul Wallenberg were able to save many lives.  The fact remains: The 
Deportations never resumed.  The majority of the Jewish population in Budapest was rescued. 
 The halting of the deportation in July, as late as it occurred, was an event of major 
significance.  Hitler had expressed his firm intention to retain his occupational forces in Hungary 
until the "Jewish question" was totally solved.lix  The intention to liquidate the Jews remaining 
in Budapest was not abandoned even after Horthy's action, and Ambassador Veesenmayer had 
instructions from Berlin to prepare the resumption of the deportations.  But Hitler's plans had 
suffered a major setback, and this state of affairs may be attributed largely to the pressure of 
foreign governments and to the deteriorating military situation for Germany.  The Auschwitz 
report played a crucial role in this turn of events by influencing them from within Budapest 
when he was able to read the text first-hand, as well from the outside when he realized that the 
Allies were in possession of the same information. 
 A coordinated effort by the Christian leaders to enlighten the public through 
proclamations in the churches appears to have been a dangerous option but, under the 
circumstances, the most realistic one within Hungary at least to slow down, if not to stop, the 
“The ‘Myth’ and Reality of Rescue from the Holocaust: The Karski–Koestler and Vrba–Wetzler Reports.“ 
The Yearbook of the Research Centre for German and Austrian Exile Studies 2 (2000), pp. 171–208. 
Publisher’s official version: http://www.rodopi.nl/senj.asp?BookId=exile+2.  Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu. 
27 
 
deportations even earlier.  Jenö Lévai has argued that Catholic leaders--Pope Pius XII in 
particular--did not remain silent.  Lévai points out that Pope Pius XII and his representatives did 
lodge protests with the Hungarian government.lx  It is true that the apostolic nuncio in Hungary, 
Angelo Rotta, approached, informed, and warned Prime Minister Sztójay about the actions 
against Jews on four occasions in April and May.lxi  But the difficulty with Lévai's evidence is that 
the protests (treating primarily Christian Jews, to be sure) were not public ones, and since their 
existence was not general knowledge, they could be ignored by those who collaborated with 
the Nazis.  Szenes's interview with András Zakar shows that Cardinal Serédi, the Hungarian 
church leader in the best position to voice opposition, finally withdrew a pastoral letter critical 
of the government's actions.  In general, Christian church leaders were intent, at most, on 
saving mainly Christian Jews, leaving the majority of those threatened without any effective 
spokesman.  The interviews also show that the Hungarian churches were unable and, in part, 
unwilling to close ranks to lodge a unified public protest in their churches.  The Szenes interview 
provides dramatic evidence that the reluctance of Pope Pius XII to condemn the Nazi 
extermination program publicly had an effect on the situation in Hungary.  Cardinal Seredi 
insisted his silence was justified since the Pope himself was unwilling to speak out.lxii 
 Rudolf Vrba has remained convinced that many Jews who were taken to Auschwitz 
would have attempted to resist, flee, or stop the deportations if the report about the 
conditions in the camp had been published or distributed immediately in Hungary.  Had the 
Hungarian Jews been aware of the "glowing ovens" they would have boarded the trains less 
willingly, and the entire operation would have been carried out less swiftly and smoothly.lxiii  
The swiftness of the Nazi operation, the isolation of the Jews, and the lack of avenues of escape 
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militated, however, in many cases in embattled Hungary against the translation of knowledge 
into effective opposition.   When, for example, Dr. Alexander Nathan tried to read from a report 
about Auschwitz to a Jewish labor service unit, "the reaction was awful....[They called me] 'a 
defeatist, a traitor,'  They threatened to turn me in.  It was no joke.  If not for a few Zionist friends 
they would have beaten me to the point of death."lxiv  When Dr. Imre Varga proposed a partisan 
war against the Nazis, Samu Stern, a Jewish leader in Budapest, threatened to report him to the 
Gestapo.lxv  Despite the enormous obstacles and risks for those who abandoned passivity, Vrba is 
certainly correct in his analysis that the key to any kind of rescue mission lay “in breaking the 
cornerstone of the streamlined mass murder in Auschwitz, i.e., its secrecy.”lxvi   
 The history of the Auschwitz report shows that these documents had the greatest 
impact when they were least subjected to abbreviation or interpretation.  As a precise and 
complete account of the situation in Auschwitz, the Vrba-Wetzler report was unprecedented.  
This document is unique in its objective presentation, precision, and completeness.  Like the 
Karski report, the Vrba-Wetzler report fulfilled all the requirements of immediate credibility and 
impact.  The comprehensive history of the Auschwitz death camp and its operation made it 
potentially stronger as an instrument of rescue.  It placed its initiated readers during the crisis 
year 1944 in an extraordinary position, especially within Hungary.  While with a single stroke 
eliminating doubts about previously circulating rumors, it imposed a sense of responsibility on 
those who were now in the possession of reliable knowledge about the death camps.  To be 
sure, the options for those who wished to act on their insight were few, and the risks were 
considerable.  In Hungary the implications entailed a total reevaluation of the political situation 
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as it was understood up to that time.  For the Hungarian leaders, who had helped to shape that 
political situation, a complete reorientation was not a simple matter. 
 These leaders had participated in a long-standing politics of anti-Semitism based on the 
assumption that Jews, Communists, and the Soviets all represented a great threat to national 
interests.  To varying degrees this was a factor in the position of the Polish government-in-exile 
and even that of Pope Pius XII, who had personally observed with distaste Jewish participation 
in a Bolshevik uprising.lxvii  The widely prevalent tendency to classify Jews with Communists was 
a factor that favored the Nazi designs; any effort to help the Jews publicly could be seen to 
weaken the resistance to the Communist threat. 
 Just as in the case of the Karski and Koestler reports, delays and fragmentation proved 
detrimental to rescue efforts.  If, for example, Nathan Schwalb could have turned to the media 
immediately after receiving the report, probably in May 1944, the situation could have been 
greatly different.  If at an early point the entire text of the report had been transmitted to 
Washington, instead of being truncated into short telegrams, the proposed plan to bomb 
railroad lines to Auschwitz and other camps would have had a better chance against the 
resistance of military experts unaware of or not interested in the stakes. 
 When a catastrophe occurs, a search for scapegoats often follows.  In response to the 
tragedy of the Holocaust, honorable and well-meaning people have often stood accused for a 
part in conspiracies of silence or inaction.  In most cases it was less a question of guilt than an 
inability to adapt to new, risk-laden options.  Debates of this nature tend to shift to 
personalities rather than processes.  The potential lesson for future generations, however, 
might be in learning more about the problems that hindered effective rescue.  In face of 
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entrenched traditions and policies, only a radical reversal, brought about by the immediate 
communication of new information, could produce significant results  
 If it is not productive to accuse, in retrospect, political or Church leaders for failing to 
undertake actions that did not appear to be their own interests, there is perhaps merit in 
understanding the processes and points in time that could have allowed for realistic 
alternatives.  The history of the Holocaust reports reveals that in a condition of widespread 
secrecy the entrenched political orientations, leaders will remain unmoved unless confronted 
by a strong wave of public opinion.  How difficult it is to mobilize public opinion in such times 
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